Date when decision was rendered: 15.2.1996

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 517; R-94/823

Reference to source

KKO 1996:17.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1996 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1996 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1996 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1996

Pages: pp. 95-103

Subject

fair trial, legal assistance, freedom of expression,
rättvis rättegång, rättshjälp, yttrandefrihet,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, oikeusapu, ilmaisuvapaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 27, section 2 of the Penal Code

= strafflagen 27 kapitel 2 §

= rikoslaki 27 luku 2 §

Abstract

The legal counsel of the defendant had during the criminal proceedings accused the prosecutor of having deliberately misused his discretion and thus acted against his legal obligations.The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the counsel had not provided substantiated reasons to support his allegations and was therefore guilty of public slander.One justice, dissenting, argued that the legal counsel of an accused person has, if the interests of his client so require, freedom to criticise the acts of the prosecution without danger of being punished.This right is part of the right to a fair trial and is a central human rights principle in states abiding by the rule of law.According to the dissenting opinion, this principle becomes illusionary if the freedom of speech of the legal counsel is excessively limited.The majority of the Supreme Court approved the arguments of the court of appeal.The court of appeal held that the legal counsel had, as such, a right to criticise the prosecution and express his doubts about the correctness of the acts of the prosecution.However, the court of appeal stated that the legal counsel had not sufficiently substantiated the foundations of his allegations.(A vote).

See also the case of Nikula v.Finland (Application No. 31611/96), judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 21 March 2002.

27.3.1998 / 1.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 4.6.1997

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 2061; R96/1572

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

respect for private life, communication, respect for correspondence, freedom of expression, limitations of rights and freedoms,
respekt för privatliv, kommunikation, respekt för korrespondens, yttrandefrihet, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter,
yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, viestintä, kirjeenvaihdon kunnioittaminen, ilmaisuvapaus, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 8 of the Constitution Act; sections 27 and 28 of the Criminal Investigations Act

= regeringsformen 8 §; förundersökningslagen 27 § och 28 §

= hallitusmuoto 8 §; esitutkintalaki 27 § ja 28 §.

ECHR-8, ECHR-10

Abstract

The police was investigating an alleged copyright offence in which an unidentified person had sent e-mail messages infringing copyrights to Internet newsgroups through an anonymous server run by a Finnish company.A, the managing director and owner of the company, was heard as a witness during the pretrial investigation of the case.The police demanded that A hand over to the police the sender's e-mail address which had been recorded in the anonymous server's database.A referred to the confidentiality of the message and refused.On the application of the police, the court of first instance made a decision obligating A to reveal the e-mail address.A appealed against the decision to the Helsinki Court of Appeal referring to section 8 of the Constitution Act and to the protection of the confidentiality of a message.The court of appeal noted that the protection of the confidentiality of a message, as prescribed in section 8 of the Constitution Act, covers not only the contents of the message but also other information which is relevant with regard to the confidentiality of the message, such as the name and address of the sender or the receiver.However, in this case the messages were sent to newsgroups in a public Internet network and were thus public.The fact that the messages were sent through an anonymous server was not relevant.The court of appeal concluded that A could not refuse to reveal the e-mail address on the basis of section 8 of the Constitution Act and that there were no other legal grounds for such refusal either.The court further referred to Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR and noted that the rights protected by these articles may be subject to restrictions which are prescribed by law and necessary, for example, for the purposes of crime investigation.A was obligated to reveal the requested information.The Supreme Court refused A leave to appeal.

1.4.1998 / 30.5.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 16.9.1994

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 4231; 2925/1/93

Reference to source

KHO 1994-A-8.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1994 A, General Part

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1994 A, allmän del

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1994 A, yleinen osa

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1994

Pages: pp. 19-23

Subject

drugs, freedom of association, freedom of expression,
narkotika, föreningsfrihet, yttrandefrihet,
huumeet, yhdistymisvapaus, ilmaisuvapaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 1-1, 49-1-1, 49-2, 56 of the Associations Act; Narcotics Act

= föreningslagen 1 § 1 mom., 49 § 1 mom. 1 punkten, 49 § 2 mom., 56 §; narkotikalagen

= yhdistyslaki 1 § 1 mom., 49 § 1 mom. 1 kohta, 49 § 2 mom., 56 §; huumausainelaki.

ECHR-10, ECHR-11

Abstract

The Cannabis Association of Finland (Suomen kannabisyhdistys - Finlands cannabisförening) notified the Ministry of Justice that it wanted to be registered in the register of associations.The founding documents and regulations of the association were attached to the notification.According to the regulations, the aim of the association was to influence the policy and legislation relating to intoxicants in such a way as to make the use, availability and growing at home for personal use of cannabis legal for adults, as well as to study the use of cannabis in different cultures and periods of time.The Ministry of Justice, basing its decision on sections 1-1 and 49 of the Associations Act, rejected the notification, as it considered the aim of the association to be contrary to morals in that it was contrary to the prevailing legal and moral concepts of Finnish society.

The association appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, demanding to be included in the associations register, claiming that the decision of the Ministry violated their constitutional rights, the Associations Act and Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR.In its decision the Supreme Administrative Court referred to the same articles of the ECHR granting a right to freedom of expression and to freedom of association, weighing these against Finland's obligations under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.The Narcotics Act prohibits acts contrary to the convention.The Associations Act in turn prohibits the registration of associations with aims contrary to law or morals.

The aims of the Cannabis Association, as stated in its regulations, to influence the policy and legislation relating to intoxicants in such a way as to make the use, availability and growing at home for personal use of cannabis legal for adults, could in the opinion of the Court not as such be regarded as contrary to morals.The nature of the change aimed at must also be taken into account.Encouraging a habit detrimental to health must be seen as an aim of the association.Taking into account that the use of cannabis is criminalized and not generally accepted in society, but still regarded as an exceptional, unhealthy habit, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that an association whose aims include encouraging such a habit is contrary to morals as laid out in section 1-1 of the Associations Act.The Court rejected the appeal.

See also Application No. 26712/95, Larmela v.Finland, decision of the European Commission of Human Rights, 28 May 1997 (inadmissible).

7.4.1998 / 3.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 4.2.1974

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 504; 1884/31/71

Reference to source

KHO 1974-A-31.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1974 A, General Part

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1974 A, allmän del

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1974 A, yleinen osa

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1976

Pages: pp. 52-57

Subject

freedom of assembly, freedom of expression,
församlingsfrihet, yttrandefrihet,
kokoontumisvapaus, ilmaisuvapaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 5, 7 and 10 of the Constitution Act; section 12 of the Local Government Act

= regeringsformen 5 §, 7 §, 10 §; kommunallagen 12 §

= hallitusmuoto 5 §, 7 §, 10 §; kuntalaki 12 §

Abstract

The city council confirmed an ordinance of the city of Turku which, i.a., prohibited the use of loudspeakers without permission of the police in public places or in such a way that a loudspeaker situated in a private place could be heard in a public place, even if the loudspeakers were used for a public meeting.It also required permission for posting notices in public places.

Association A appealed to the court of appeal, claiming, i.a., that the ordinance violated the freedom of association and freedom of expression as loudspeakers were needed at public meetings, and that it therefore was contrary to the Constitution Act.The court of appeal rejected the appeal, regarding the ordinance as necessary and as within the competence of the adopting body.

The Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance did not make the freedom of expression and association as such subject to the approval of the authorities, but was adopted to enable the authorities to consider beforehand whether the use of loudspeakers or posting of notices was a threat to public order and security and, if this was the case, to prohibit the measures.The ordinance did not violate the Constitution Act.

17.4.1998 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 25.3.1982

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1234; 1995/31/81

Reference to source

KHO 1982-A-2.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1982 A, General Part

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1982 A, allmän del

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1982 A, yleinen osa

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1982

Pages: pp. 45-47

Subject

elections, freedom of expression, equality,
val, yttrandefrihet, jämlikhet,
vaalit, ilmaisuvapaus, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 10 of the Constitution Act; sections 25, 139, 155 of the Local Government Act; Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of of Judical Procedure

= regeringsformen 10 §; kommunallagen 25 §, 139 §, 155 §; rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= hallitusmuoto 10 §; kuntalaki 25 §, 139 §, 155 §, oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §

Abstract

The town executive board of Loimaa decided that election posters for the upcoming local elections could be placed only in certain places.Each party taking part in the elections was allowed the same number of posters.The decision was based on the town police regulations with reference to public order and security, as no Act of Parliament or Decree regulated the placement of election posters.

A political party appealed to the county administrative court.According to the party, centralizing the election posters to certain places restricted the possibilities of political parties to inform the voters of their programme as well as the possibilities of the voters to form their opinion.It was thus in violation of the freedom of expression as prescribed in section 10 of the Constitution Act.The party also referred to section 10 of the Political Parties Act which requires equal treatment of all parties.As the party had the largest number of candidates, the decision of the town executive board meant that the party was allowed a smaller number of posters per candidate than other parties.Furthermore, the party claimed that X, who was the elections ombudsman for party Y, should not have participated in the decision of the town executive board as he was not impartial.

The county administrative court found that there was no reason to doubt X's impartiality under Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure or section 25-1 of the Local Government Act.It also concluded that the restrictions as to the placement of posters did not violate the freedom of expression of the party concerned.

The Supreme Administrative Court came to the same conclusion as the county administrative court as regards X's impartiality.It also found that the decision of the town executive board only prohibited the free placement of election posters and was not in contradiction with section 10 of the Constitution Act.Furthermore, the Court concluded that the decision to divide the places for posters equally between the parties participating in the elections was not a violation of the equal treatment of all parties.The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the county administrative court.

17.4.1998 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 21.4.1998

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 1245; S97/1376

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorkontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

freedom of expression, legal counsel, limitations of rights and freedoms,
yttrandefrihet, rättegångsbiträde, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter,
ilmaisuvapaus, oikeudenkäyntiavustaja, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 14, section 7 and Chapter 15, section 10a of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 14 kapitel 7 § och 15 kapitel 10a §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 14 luku 7 § ja 15 luku 10a §.

ECHR-10-2

Abstract

A had been counsel to Company X Ltd. before the Helsinki Court of First Instance.In this position, A had submitted to the court a statement in which he had used insulting and disrespectful language directed towards the chairman of the court.As a result, the court of first instance had prohibited A from appearing before the court for a period of one year, on the basis of Chapter 15, section 10a of the Code of Judicial Procedure.

A appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal which noted that it is the task of a legal counsel to represent his client's interests within the limits of the law and professional ethics.The counsel has an obligation to call attention to all faults and deficiencies that he observes.For this reason, his freedom of expression is extensive.The freedom of expression of a legal counsel is, however, limited by Chapter 14, section 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.According to Article 10-2 of the ECHR, the freedom of expression may also be restricted, provided that the restriction is prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.Although a legal counsel has an extensive freedom of expression, any criticism directed against a court of law and its chairman must be objective and based on facts.According to the court of appeal, A had failed to present evidence or facts that show that the chairman of the court of first instance, as A claimed, would have demanded unnecessary information regarding the case, that he would have been biased, expressed unlawful demands or tried to lead the parties astray.A could also have expressed his observations without using insulting and disrespectful language.This, together with the fact that A had not answered the inquiries made by the court of first instance show that A has not demonstrated the skills and knowledge necessary for him to act as a legal counsel.The court of appeal concluded that considering the circumstances there are reasons to prohibit A from appearing as a legal counsel before the Helsinki Court of First Instance.The court of appeal upheld the decision by the court of first instance.The Supreme Court refused A leave of appeal.

23.10.2002 / 27.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 31.10.2000

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report no. 3077; R99/1857

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

freedom of expression, freedom of the press, respect for private life, respect for family life, doping,
yttrandefrihet, tryckfrihet, respekt för privatliv, respekt för familjeliv, dopning,
ilmaisuvapaus, painovapaus, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, perhe-elämän kunnioittaminen, doping,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 27, section 2 of the Penal Code

= strafflagen 27 kapitel 2 §

= rikoslaki 27 luku 2 §.

ECHR-10

Abstract

A reporter and an editor-in-chief of the Finnish News Agency had published a piece of news according to which a former top skier, while he was still active, had used hormones in order to improve his performance.They also claimed that "persons in a leading position" within the Finnish Ski Association were involved in the case.The name of the skier was given but not the names of the other persons possibly involved.The skier as well as a number of persons in a position of authority within the Ski Association started legal proceedings against the reporter and the editor, accusing them of public libel and claiming damages.Before the court, the defendants referred to their right as journalists to protect their sources.Partly because of this, they were not able to provide sufficient evidence in support of their claims.They were both convicted.Damages were awarded to all claimants.All the parties in the case appealed against the decision.

In assessing the balance between the freedom of expression and the right to privacy, the Helsinki Court of Appeal referred to Article 10-2 of the ECHR and the possible restrictions of freedom of expression as well as to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v.Norway (judgment of 20 May 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999 III) and Ionel Dalban v.Romania (judgment of 28 September 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999 VI).The court found that the use of doping in sports is comparable to matters of public interest as specified in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights.With regard to such matters, it could be considered that the freedom of expression covers possible recourse to severe criticism and a degree of exaggeration.However, the conclusion of the court of appeal was that in this case the defendants had not proven the information given in the news to be true, nor had they shown that they had sufficient reasons to believe that the information was true or could be substantiated.The court found the defendants guilty, but mitigated their punishments as compared to those imposed by the court of first instance.In assessing the question of pecuniary damages, the court of appeal referred to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A, no. 316-B).As compared to the decision of the court of first instance, the appeal court reduced the amount of damages as well as the number of persons entitled to damages.In addition to the skier, only a few persons within the Ski Association were awarded compensation.

The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case.

28.10.2002 / 12.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 6.5.1998

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 773; 2084/1/97

Reference to source

KHO 1998:13.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1998 I January-June

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1998 I januari-juni

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1998 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 1998

Pages: pp. 85-90

Subject

freedom of expression, right to receive, seek and impart information, respect for private life,
yttrandefrihet, rätt att söka, mottaga och sprida upplysningar, respekt för privatliv,
ilmaisuvapaus, oikeus hankkia, vastaanottaa ja levittää tietoja, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 4, 9 and 16 of the Act on the Publicity of Official Documents; section 43 of the Police Act; sections 8 and 10 of the Constitution Act

= lag om allmänna handlingars offentlighet 4 § 9 §, 16 §; polislag 43 §; regeringsformen 8 §, 10 §

= laki yleisten asiakirjain julkisuudesta 4 § 9 §, 16 §; poliisilaki 43 §; hallitusmuoto 8 §, 10 §.

ECHR-8

Abstract

The police refused to give a journalist access to documents concerning a pretrial investigation regarding criminal charges for a sexual offence.The journalist appealed to the county administrative court.With reference to section 4 of the Act on the Publicity of Official Documents, the county administrative court ruled that the material emanating from the pretrial investigation was to be considered as public since the pretrial investigation had been terminated and the case had been closed.The court also referred to section 10 of the Constitution Act, according to which documents in the possession of public authorities are public unless their publicity has been separately restricted by Act of Parliament for compelling reasons.

The police appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court.The Court based its argumentation on the right to privacy enshrined in section 8 of the Constitution Act and in Article 8 of the ECHR and considered this right against the background of the relevant provisions concerning the publicity of documents in the possession of a public authority.The Court referred to section 43 of the Police Act, according to which a policeman may not disclose information which he has obtained during the course of his duties when such information concerns a person's private life and its disclosure may cause the person harm.Furthermore, section 16 of the Act on the Publicity of Official Documents provides that documents pertaining to a confidential matter are also to be regarded as confidential.Therefore, the material from the pretrial investigation in this case should be considered as confidential documents as the restrictions to publicity were based on the law.

8.11.2002 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 4.4.2001

Judicial body: Turku Court of First Instance = Åbo tingsrätt = Turun käräjäoikeus

Reference: Report no. 01/1082; R01/586

Reference to source

Registry of the Turku Court of First Instance

Åbo tingsrätts registratorskontor

Turun käräjäoikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

racism, freedom of expression,
rasism, yttrandefrihet,
rasismi, ilmaisuvapaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 2, section 17 of the Penal Code, section 12 of the Constitution Act

= strafflagen 2 kapitel 17 §, grundlagen 12 §

= rikoslaki 2 luku 17 §, perustuslaki 12 §.

ECHR-10, CCPR-19

Abstract

ABSTRACT: A had published in the Internet homepage of an association a caricature and a writing concerning Islam and muslims.The picture as well as the writing were considered offensive and A was charged with incitement to racial hatred.A referred to freedom of expression and claimed that his statements were based on facts presented in the media.The court of first instance also referred to freedom of expression as prescribed in the Constitution Act, the ECHR and the CCPR and noted that the exercise of this right carries with it duties and responsibilities.In the court s view, it was possible to use a sharp or provocative style in a caricature.However, in this case, the picture was extremely rude and had no factual content.It had the essential elements of incitement to racial hatred as provided for in the Penal Code.The court held that the same applied to A s use of the word cutthroath when referring to muslims.In addition, A s writing as a whole had a hostile and insulting tone.A was sentenced to a fine.The court of appeal did not change the decision of the first instance court (Turku Court of Appeal, decision of 21 November 2002, Report No. 2962; R01/1485).The Supreme Court did not grant A leave to appeal (decision of 23 December 2003).

13.2.2004 / 13.2.2004 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 7.11.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2729; 1258/1/03

Reference to source

KHO 2003:77.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2003 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2003 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2003 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2007

Pages: pp. 317-330

Subject

freedom of expression, public access to documents,
yttrandefrihet, allmänna handlingars offentlighet,
ilmaisuvapaus, asiakirjojen julkisuus,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 3, 17 and 24 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities

= lag om offentlighet i myndigheternas verksamhet 3 §, 17 § och 24 §

= laki viranomaistoiminnan julkisuudesta 3 §, 17 § ja 24 §.

ECHR-10

Abstract

A journalist had requested from the security police for a document which contained information about Finnish citizens who were suspected of having contacts with foreign intelligence services.With reference to the secrecy obligations prescribed in the Act on the Openness of Government Activities the security police denied the request on the grounds that giving access to the document could compromise state security and Finland's international relations.The administrative court rejected the journalist's appeal.In the appeal before the Supreme Administrative Court, the journalist claimed, among other things, that concepts such as "state security" or "compromising international relations" were very broad.The security police should have given more detailed and specified grounds for its refusal.The journalist also mentioned the role of the media as a "public watchdog" and referred to the following decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v.Norway (judgment of 20 May 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-III), Jersild v.Denmark (judgment of 23 September 1994, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 298), De Haes and Gijsels v.Belgium (judgment of 24 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I), Prager and Oberschlick v.Austria (judgment of 26 April 1995, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 313) and Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II).The Supreme Administrative Court decided the case on the basis of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities and did not refer to the ECHR or the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.The Court found that the security police had received the document by means of a confidential exchange of information and while carrying out its tasks in maintaining state security.It was not obvious that access to the document would not compromise state security.The Supreme Administrative Court did not change the decision of the administrative court.

21.4.2004 / 3.7.2009 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 14.8.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1941; R2001/748

Reference to source

KKO 2003:69.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2003 II July - December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2003 II juli - december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2003 II heinä - joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: 396-400

Subject

freedom of expression, limitations of rights and freedoms, lawyers,
yttrandefrihet, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter, jurister,
ilmaisuvapaus, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset, lakimiehet,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 14, section 7 and Chapter 30, section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 14 kapitel 7 § och 30 kapitel 2 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 14 luku 7 § ja 30 luku 2 §.

ECHR-10

Abstract

A, who had acted as an attorney in an appeal case, had been sentenced to a fine by the court of appeal for having used offensive and disrespectful language in the letter of appeal.A had, among other things, criticized the members of the first instance court and their judicial ethics.The decision of the court of appeal was based on Chapter 14, section 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.A appealed to the Supreme Court.In its decision, the Supreme Court concentrated on the question whether it was possible in this case to appeal without leave to appeal, and came to an affirmative conclusion.As to the merits, the Supreme Court did not change the decision of the court of appeal.One justice of the Supreme Court submitted a concurring opinion, and another justice agreed with this opinion.In the concurring opinion, the justice discussed, among other things, the possibility of restrictions of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10-2 of the ECHR.He concluded that the penal provision in Chapter 14, section 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure constituted a restriction which was necessary for the appropriate administration of justice and which applied also to statements and letters submitted to the court by an attorney on behalf of his or her client.A admitted that he had tried to shock by his choice of language and referred to the opinions of the European Court of Human Rights according to which freedom of expression includes recourse to a certain degree of exaggeration and even provocation.The concurring justice pointed out that the opinions A was referring to did not apply to criticism addressed to a court in written pleadings.On the contrary, the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised that it must be possible to criticize courts without making accusations against the members of the court personally.The justice referred to the cases of Barford (Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 149) and Prager and Oberschlick v.Austria (Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A.Vol. 313).

21.4.2004 / 7.4.2005 / ASADINMA

Date when decision was rendered: 18.12.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3128; R2002/602

Reference to source

KKO 2003:128.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2003 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2003 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2003 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: 799-805

Subject

freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement,
yttrandefrihet, församlingsfrihet, rörelsefrihet,
ilmaisuvapaus, kokoontumisvapaus, liikkumisvapaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 2, section 1 of the Coercive Measures Act; Chapter 25, section 8 of the Penal Code, sections 9, 12, 13 and 14-3 of the Constitution Act

= tvångsmedelslagen 2 kapitel 1 §; strafflagen 25 kapitel 8 §; grundlagen 9 §, 12 §, 13 § och 14 § 3 mom.

= pakkokeinolaki 2 luku 1 §; rikoslaki 25 luku 8 §; perustuslaki 9 §, 12 §, 13 § ja 14 § 3 mom.

ECHR-10; ECHR-11; ECHRP-4-2

Abstract

A and a group of other environmental activists had protested against the logging of timber by staying so close to the logging machine that the work had to be interrupted.A was suspected of coercion under the Penal Code.On the basis of the Coercive Measures Act, the police had ordered that A shall not enter the territory of the municipality where the logging was carried out as well as the territory of two other municipalities close by where logging was expected to start in the near future.The ban's duration was originally close to two months, but on A's appeal the court of first instance had reduced it to a little over a month.A wanted the ban to be abolished altogether and appealed all the way to the Supreme Court which considered the case although the ban by that time had expired.

The Supreme Court held that as A's actions had in fact prevented the logging, A could be suspected of coercion and the ban was justified.However, the ban should have been limited to the municipality where the logging took place at that time, and it could be in force only as long as that logging had been completed (in practice, one week after the ban had been ordered).The Court noted that the ban infringed on A's freedom of expression, assembly and movement.However, as it was limited to a certain area and time period, it only caused a minor inconvenience to A and was justified considering its purpose (i.e. prevention of possibly considerable economic loss).

Two justices of the Supreme Court noted that although A's presence had interrupted the logging, A had not used violence or threat.In addition, before the police had arrested the activists, no efforts had apparently been made in order to persuade the activists to leave the area.The two justices held that the Penal Code could not be interpreted expansively to the detriment of the person suspected of a crime.They also referred to the freedom of expression, assembly and movement as provided for in the Constitution Act and the ECHR.The justices concluded that A's actions had not amounted to coercion and the ban was thus not justified.One of the two justices also noted that in addition to preventing A from moving freely in the country the ban prevented A from exercising his freedom of expression and assembly in a societal issue which A considered important.The justice referred to section 14-3 of the Constitution Act, according to which the public authorities shall promote the opportunities for the individual to participate in societal activities.In the justice's view, the obligation speaks for a restrictive use of coercive measures in a case where a person is suspected of a crime when having gone a bit too far in carrying out a societal activity which as such is protected by the Constitution and that person is not a so-called habitual offender.

21.4.2004 / 7.6.2004 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 14.1.2003

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 126; R01/3905

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

freedom of expression, limitations of rights and freedoms,
yttrandefrihet, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter,
ilmaisuvapaus, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 24, section 9 of the Penal Code

= strafflagen 24 kapitel 9 §

= rikoslaki 24 luku 9 §.

ECHR-10-2

Abstract

An article in a periodical had dealt with the assistants of members of Parliament and their work in support of the re-election of the candidates.A former member of the Parliament, A, was assisting in the election campaign of a candidate and carried out this work within the framework of his own consultant firm.In the article, A's business activities were compared to the activities of a "dubious businessman".There was also some other misleading information in the article which was later corrected.However, the reference to a dubious businessman was not corrected.

With reference to the Penal Code, the court of appeal pointed out that spreading false information or a false insinuation of another person is not justified even when dealing with politics.Furthermore, the purpose of criticism may not be to offend another person.The court then noted that freedom of expression as provided for in Article 10 of the ECHR may be subject to restrictions that are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the reputation and rights of others.The court discussed the cases of Dalban v.Romania (judgment of 28 September 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VI) and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v.Norway (judgment of 20 May 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-III) in which the European Court of Human Rights expressed the principle that the press must not overstep certain bounds in respect of the reputation and rights of others, although journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation.The court continued by pointing out that the reference to a "dubious businessman" had not been corrected.Even if A had refused to disclose information requested by the periodical, it did not justify the use of a defamatory expression.The court of appeal upheld the decision of the court of first instance.The editor of the periodical and the journalist who had written the article were sentenced for defamation to a fine.The decision is final.

22.4.2004 / 22.4.2004 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 26.3.2004

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 0687; R2003/614

Reference to source

KKO 2004:30.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2004 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2004 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2004 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: 183-193

Subject

freedom of expression, respect for private life, respect for family life,
yttrandefrihet, respekt för privatliv, respekt för familjeliv,
ilmaisuvapaus, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, perhe-elämän kunnioittaminen,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 17, section 24-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; section 16 of the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media; section 12 of the Constitution Act

= rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 24 § 2 mom.; lag om yttrandefrihet i masskommunikation 16 §; grundlagen 12 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 24 § 2 mom.; laki sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkoviestinnässä 16 §; perustuslaki 12 §.

ECHR-8; ECHR-10

Abstract

An anonymous writer had published a text on the Internet.Later, publishing house X published an edited version of the same text.The author used a pseudonym.B claimed that parts of the Internet publication constituted libel and asked the police to investigate the matter.The managing director of the publishing house, A, was heard as a witness.The police asked the court of first instance to order A to disclose the identity of the author of the Internet publication.A refused, referring among other things to the protection of journalistic sources as provided for in Chapter 17, section 24-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.Both the court of first instance and the court of appeal ruled that section 24-2 was explicitly concerning periodicals, not books or Internet publications.The court of appeal also assessed the case in the light of Article 10 of the ECHR and the Constitution Act, comparing the protection of private life with freedom of expression and discussing also the possibility of restrictions to these rights.It concluded that the statements concerning B made in the Internet publication may have caused considerable damage to B's reputation.Therefore, B's need to find out the author of the libellous text was necessary and constituted justified grounds to restrict A's freedom of expression.The Supreme Court pointed out that in the light of the Constitution Act and the ECHR it was not clear whether section 24-2 could be interpreted literally so as to apply to periodicals only.With reference to the cases of Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, pp. 483 518) and Roemen and Schmit v.Luxembourg (judgment of 25 February 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-IV), the Supreme Court noted that the European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for freedom of expression.Furthermore, the Supreme Court took account of the fact that Article 10 of the ECHR does not distinguish between various forms of expression.According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, obligations pertaining to freedom of expression cover in principle all communication regardless of its form.The Supreme Court gave as an example the case of Müller and Others (judgment of 24 May 1988, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 133).On the other hand, freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR may be subject to restrictions, and therefore the protection of journalistic sources may be restricted if necessary for the protection of the rights of others, for example, in order to solve a serious crime.The Supreme Court concluded that despite this possibility of national discretion, no distinction should be made between various forms of communication when assessing the extent of the protection of journalistic sources.The Supreme Court then drew attention to the fact that the circumstances had changed since the court of appeal gave its decision in this case.The new Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media (460/2003) had entered into force.At the same time, Chapter 17, section 24-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure had been amended.Through the new provisions the protection of journalistic sources was expanded to cover all forms of communication equally.According to the new Act, the publisher of a message provided to the public is entitled to maintain the confidentiality of the source of information in the message.The amended section 24-2 provides that as a witness the publisher of a message has a right to refuse to answer the question as to who has given the information which the message is based on or any question which cannot be answered without disclosing the information source.The transitional provisions of the new Act do not restrict the application of the Act to messages published after the entry into force of the Act only.The Supreme Court concluded that the Act was thus applicable to A's case and that A could not be obligated to disclose the author of the Internet publication.One concurring justice of the Supreme Court found that even before the entry into force of the new Act and the amendment of the Code of Judicial Procedure, section 24-2 could on the basis of the Constitution Act and Article 10 of the ECHR be interpreted expansively to cover not only periodicals but also books and other publications.

22.4.2005 / 22.4.2005 / ASADINMA

Date when decision was rendered: 2.3.2004

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 413; 2548/1/03

Reference to source

KHO 2004:25.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2004 January-June

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2004 januari-juni

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2004 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2008

Pages: pp. 197-202

Subject

freedom of expression, right to receive, seek and impart information, public access to documents,,
yttrandefrihet, rätt att söka, mottaga och sprida upplysningar, allmänna handlingars offentlighet,
ilmaisuvapaus, oikeus hankkia, vastaanottaa ja levittää tietoja, asiakirjojen julkisuus,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 3, 17, 24-1-1 and 24-2 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities; section 12 of the Constitution Act

= lag om offentlighet i myndigheternas verksamhet 3 §, 17 §, 24 § 1 mom. 1 punkten och 24 § 2 mom.; grundlagen 12 §

= laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta 3 §, 17 § 24 § 1 mom. 1 kohta ja 24 § 2 mom.; perustuslaki 12 §.

ECHR-10

Abstract

A journalist had requested from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs access to three documents.The Ministry refused with reference to the fact that the documents were coded messages in the field of foreign affairs administration and concerned political negotiations with a foreign state.They were therefore secret documents as prescribed in section 24-1-1 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities.

In his appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, the journalist referred, among other things, to the principle of proportionality in section 17 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities as well as to section 12 of the Constitution Act concerning freedom of expression and right of access to information.He also made a general reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning freedom of expression and the media.In the journalist's view, a limitation to a constitutional right had to be interpreted narrowly, in order to guarantee the widest possible implementation of access to information despite the limitations.He challenged the Ministry's decision to declare the entire documents as secret and pointed out that in fact parts of the documents had already been published in some newspapers.According to the Ministry, this had happened without the Ministry's consent.

The Supreme Administrative Court rejected the appeal.It ruled that the requested documents as a whole were secret documents and that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had the right to decide whether access is granted to these documents.In the Court's view, the fact that parts of the documents had been published in the media was irrelevant in this case.The Supreme Administrative Court based its decision on the Act on the Openness of Government Activities only and did not refer to the Constitution Act or any international human rights provisions.

25.4.2005 / 3.7.2009 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 17.11.2003

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 3427; S01/2784

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

freedom of expression, respect for private life, freedom of the press,
yttrandefrihet, respekt för privatliv, tryckfrihet,
ilmaisuvapaus, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, painovapaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 27, section 1, 2 and 3a of the Penal Code (908/1974); Chapter 5, section 1 of the Tort Liability Act; sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution Act

= strafflagen (908/1974) 27 kapitel 1 §, 2 § och 3a §; skadeståndslag 5 kapitel 1 §; grundlagen 10 § och 12 §

= rikoslaki (908/1974) 27 luku 1 §, 2 § ja 3a §; vahingonkorvauslaki 5 luku 1 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 12 §.

ECHR-8; ECHR-10

Abstract

Journalist A had written several newspaper articles in which company X had been connected with suspicions of tax offences.The director of the National Board of Taxation, B, was a shareholder and holder of procuration in the company and the brother-in-law of the principal owners of the company, C and D.The suspicions of tax offences were investigated but no one was charged.C and D claimed that the newspaper articles had violated their honour and privacy and had caused financial damage to the company.They brought an action for damages against the newspaper.The court of first instance ordered the newspaper to pay damages, but the court of appeal quashed the decision.

The court of appeal discussed at length the various aspects of freedom of expression, referring also to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, including the cases of Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v.Norway (judgment of 20 May 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-III), Bergens Tidende and Others v.Norway (judgment of 2 May 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-IV), Castells v.Spain (judgment of 23 April 1992, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 236), Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II), Colombani and Others v.France (judgment of 25 June 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-V) and Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 13 July 1995, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 316).Against the background of this discussion, the court concluded that considering B's prominent social position, A had a right perhaps even a duty to write about issues relating to the activities and taxation of company X.

When discussing whether A was guilty of defamation, the court of appeal observed that the articles written by A contained statements which were untrue and gave the reader a wrong impression of the situation.The court found this reprehensible and incompatible with the requirements set for the task of the press as a "public watchdog" in a democratic society.However, in the court's opinion the contents of the articles did not fulfill the essential elements of defamation as defined in the Penal Code.The court found that, on the basis of the evidence presented in the case, there had been reason to believe that tax offences had been committed.Most of the statements in the articles were based on information received from authorities.A's purpose was not to harm the reputation of the company or its owners but to bring out B's connection to, in A's view suspicious, decisions concerning taxation.In the court's opinion, this was a significant matter of public interest and bringing it forth was important.

Regarding the alleged violation of the right to privacy, the court of appeal noted that it was impossible in practice to write about B and company X without disclosing the name of the company, the names of its principal owners or the relationship between B, C and D.As entrepreneurs, C and D had a duty to tolerate publicity and criticism based on facts.The court concluded that the newspaper articles did not amount to a violation of the right to privacy as defined in the Penal Code.

As for negligent causing of damages the court repeated its statement concerning the to some extent untruthful and biased contents of the articles.A was an experienced journalist, and the articles had been published in a most widely-read national newspaper which was generally considered as reliable.The newspaper would have had the means to check the information given in the articles.The court of appeal ruled that A had, by negligence and by acting contrary to good journalistic practice, caused damage to company X.However, in the court's opinion, there were no especially weighty reasons, as required by the Tort Liability Act, to order the newspaper to pay damages.The court pointed out that this was an important matter of public interest, that the main issue in the articles (suspicions of tax offences) was a pertinent one and that the damage caused, as assessed by the court, was not extensive.In the court's view, ordering the newspaper to pay damages would not have led to a fair end result in this case.

The decision is final, as the Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case (decision of 6 October 2004, no. 2229, S2004/69).In its decision, the court of first instance emphasised the duty of the press to impart reliable and accurate information as well as the right of all parties involved to have their views published.The court found that A had been fully aware that the articles were not completely truthful and that they would harm the company and its owners.Moreover, the court assessed the damage caused as far more extensive than the court of appeal did in its own assessment.

25.4.2005 / 25.4.2005 / ASADINMA

Date when decision was rendered: 12.2.2004

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 511; R02/1938

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

freedom of expression, respect for private life, judges, freedom of the press,
yttrandefrihet, respekt för privatliv, domare, tryckfrihet,
ilmaisuvapaus, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen, tuomarit, painovapaus,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 27, sections 1 and 2 of the Penal Code (908/1974); sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution Act

= strafflagen (908/1974) 27 kapitel 1 § och 2 §; grundlagen 10 § och 12 §

= rikoslaki (908/1974) 27 luku 1 § ja 2 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 12 §.

CCPR-19; ECHR-10

Abstract

A newspaper had published an article which included an interview with X.X had, among other things, been convicted of economic offenses, and at the time of the interview there were two other cases concerning economic offenses pending against him.These facts were mentioned in the newspaper article.In the interview, X told that he had applied for an annulment of a decision of the Helsinki Court of Appeal in one of the cases against him on the grounds that one of the judges who had decided the case should have been disqualified.The judge's name was not mentioned.X claimed that the judge was his enemy because X had on a previous occasion criticised the judge and his actions.X had also told earlier that the judge had taken a bribe by accepting a free luxury trip from a person who was suspected of a bankruptcy offence.In the newspaper article it was mentioned that the judge had wanted to bring charges against X for defamation but the prosecutor had decided not to prosecute.The judge to whom the article referred, A, brought charges for defamation against the newspaper and the journalist who had written the article.The accusations in the article were false.A had not taken the alleged bribe nor brought charges against X.Although the judge's identity had not been revealed in the article, it had become known to some persons at A's workplace at the Helsinki Court of Appeal and this had caused some inconvenience for A.

The court of first instance sentenced the newspaper and the journalist for defamation.In the court's view, a claim that a judge has accepted a bribe was an important matter of public interest which had to be publicized provided that there was sufficient factual basis for that claim.However, in this case the facts had not been checked and A's views had not been heard.The court found that on the basis of the information given in the article and with the help of the registers of the Helsinki Court of Appeal it had been possible for those who worked at the court and also for others interested to identify the judge the article was referring to, and this had caused damage to A.In its decision, the court of first instance referred, among other provisions, to sections 10 (right to privacy) and 12 (freedom of expression) of the Constitution Act, Article 19 of the CCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR.One lay member of the court would have dismissed the charges as being contrary to the freedom of expression, the Constitution Act and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Both parties appealed to the court of appeal.In its decision, the court of appeal discussed at length the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and in particular the cases of Barfod (judgment of 22 February 1989, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 149), Jersild v.Denmark (judgment of 23 September 1994, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 298), Prager and Oberschlick v.Austria (judgment of 26 April 1995, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 313), Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v.Norway (judgment of 20 May 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-III), Dalban v.Romania (judgment of 28 September 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VI), Bergens Tidende and Others v.Norway (judgment of 2 May 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-IV), Colombani and Others v.France (judgment of 25 June 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-V), Pasalaris v.Greece (decision of 4 July 2002), Harlanova v.Latvia (decision of 3 April 2003), Perna v.Italy (judgment of 6 May 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-V), and Cumpana and Mazare v.Romania (judgment of 10 June 2003).The court considered, among other issues, the responsibility of a journalist for statements made by another person in an interview, the duty of a journalist to check the factual basis of the imparted information as well as possible limitations of freedom of expression for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

The court found that the article contained incorrect and offensive information.On the basis of the article a reader could get the impression that the judge in question has possibly broken the law.In writing the article, the journalist had not checked the facts as carefully as he should have considering that the accusations were serious and that X because of his background could not be regarded as a reliable source of information.Although A's name was not mentioned in the article, the journalist should under the circumstances have given A the possibility to present his views.However, unlike the court of first instance, the court of appeal did not find the journalist or the newspaper guilty of defamation.Several cases against X had been decided in the Helsinki Court of Appeal and a number of judges had participated in handling the cases.In the court's opinion, even those close to A could not have identified him on the basis of the information given in the article, especially as some of the information was incorrect.Also, for those who were not close to A, it was not easy to find out the identity of the judge solely on the basis of the information given in the article.The court of appeal dismissed the charges.The decision is final as the Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case (decision of 3 December 2004, no. 2798, R2004/329).

25.4.2005 / 25.4.2005 / ASADINMA

Date when decision was rendered: 17.7.2002

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of First Instance = Helsingfors tingsrätt = Helsingin käräjäoikeus

Reference: Report No. 02/7790; R01/9247

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of First Instance

Helsingfors tingsrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin käräjäoikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

freedom of expression, respect for private life,
yttrandefrihet, respekt för privatliv,
ilmaisuvapaus, yksityiselämän kunnioittaminen,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 24, section 9 of the Penal Code; sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution Act

= strafflagen 24 kapitel 9 §; grundlagen 10 § och 12 §

= rikoslaki 24 luku 9 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 12 §.

ECHR-10

Abstract

In a radio news broadcast concerning problems in truck transports between Finland and Russia, news editor X had suggested that A, who was employed by the Ministry of Transport, and his wife B, who was also a government official, had connections to criminal circles in Russia.X had received this information when interviewing Y, the chairman of an employees' organisation for drivers.Both X and Y were charged with defamation.They referred to freedom of expression and to the fact that A was a public official.The court of first instance took note of sections 10 (the right to privacy) and 12 (freedom of expression) of the Constitution Act and Article 10 of the ECHR.It also made a general reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and noted that distinction has been made between facts and value judgments.Freedom of expression does not protect the presentation of incorrect facts, whereas it may include a right to give one's opinion of a fact, even though someone may consider that opinion as offensive.The court ruled that in this case a person's honour had been injured by means of presenting false insinuations which could not be considered as value judgments.X and Y had not criticized A's or B's official activities.The insinuations were directed to A as a private person.The court ruled that in this case protecting A's and B's honour was not contrary to Article 10 of the ECHR.X and Y were sentenced to a fine.

The court of appeal agreed with the first instance court (decision of 30 April 2004, no. 1575, R02/2801).The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal (decision of 20 October 2004, no. 2355, R2004/617).

25.4.2005 / 25.4.2005 / ASADINMA

Date when decision was rendered: 3.10.2005

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2489; 1812/3/04

Reference to source

KHO 2005:62.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2005 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2005 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2005 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2009

Pages: pp. 369-380

Subject

elections, freedom of expression, right to vote, equality,
val, yttrandefrihet, rätt att rösta, jämlikhet,
vaalit, ilmaisuvapaus, äänioikeus, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 2 and 40 of the Locl Government Act; sections 12 and 14 of the Constitution Act

= kommunallag 2 § och 40 §; grundlagen 12 § och 14 §

= kuntalaki 2 § ja 40 §; perustuslaki 12 § ja 14 §.

ECHR-10; ECHRP-1-3; CCPR-19; CCPR-25

Abstract

A municipal executive board had given general instructions regarding the upcoming Parliamentary elections and the placing of election posters in the areas owned by the municipality.In these areas, the municipality would arrange the placing of election posters by reserving an equal amount of space for each political party.Any other placing of posters was forbidden.In order to cover the costs for these arrangements, the municipality requested from each political party participating in the elections a sum of EUR 840.Political party X appealed against the decision to the administrative court and further to the Supreme Administrative Court claiming that the decision resulted in unreasonable restrictions of the right to freedom of expression and the right to vote and to be elected.The Supreme Administrative Court held that a municipality has a right to decide in which way the areas owned by the municipality are used in campaing publicity.The decision of the executive board did not restrict the possibility to place election posters in privately owned areas.Considering the requirements of public order, public safety and a pleasant city environment, the municipality may decide that election campaign publicity is centralized as defined in the decision of the executive board.The impact on freedom of expression is not unreasonable in relation to the purpose of such arrangements.The Supreme Administrative Court also noted that a municipality had no statutory duty to arrange election campaign publicity.In view of the fact that the municipality had, on the basis of municipal self-government, voluntarily undertaken to arrange the placing of election posters, it was within its authority to require compensation for such arrangements.The payment of EUR 840 was based on the actual costs of the arrangements.The Court pointed out that there were also other means than outdoor campaigns available for political parties in distributing information about their programme and their candidates.It concluded that requesting the sum of EUR 840 as a compensation did not unreasonably restrict the right to freedom of expression and was also not in violation of the principle of equal treatment.

26.5.2006 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 5.9.2005

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2193; 1111/1/03

Reference to source

KHO 2005:58.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2005 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2005 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2005 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2009

Pages: pp. 317-323

Subject

freedom of expression, limitations of rights and freedoms,
yttrandefrihet, inskränkningar av friheter och rättigheter,
ilmaisuvapaus, oikeuksien ja vapauksien rajoitukset,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 15a and 40 of the Local Government Act; section 12 of the Constitution Act

= kommunallag 15a § och 40 §; grundlagen 12 §

= kuntalaki 15a § ja 40 §; perustuslaki 12 §.

Abstract

A member of a municipal council, A, had several times exceeded the time allowed in the council's rules of procedure for individual members in addressing the council and had continued his address despite the orders of the chairman of the council.On the basis of section 15a of the Local Government Act, the chairman ordered A to be removed from the council's meeting.As A had acted against his duties as a municipal councilman by breaching the council's rules of procedure, the council decided, on the basis of section 40 of the Local Government Act, to report the offence and to exclude A from the work of the council while the matter was being investigated.The decision was enforced immediately.Some two months later, the district prosecutor decided not to carry out an investigation.

The Supreme Administrative Court found that A had acted against his duties when disobeying the orders of the chairman pertaining to the limitations prescribed in the council's rules of procedure.The chairman was right in ordering A to be removed from the council's meeting.However, the Court held that, taking into account the right to freedom of expression as provided for in section 12 of the Constitution Act, section 15a of the Local Government Act, which restricted that right, must be given a narrow interpretation.Section 15a contains the measures a council chairman may have recourse to when a council member disturbs the meeting by his or her behaviour.A's actions as a council member cannot be restricted in excess of these measures.Though the Supreme Administrative Court accepted the council's decision to report the offence, it ruled that the council had exceeded its authority when excluding A from the council's work and had in that respect made a decision which was against the law.

26.5.2006 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI